This paper studies volatility and jump risk from a conditional and an international perspective using data on index options from US (S&P 500 index options), European (FTSE index options) and Asian markets (Nikkei index options). In order to explain the cross-section of expected option returns across strikes and maturities, we focus on return-based multi-factor models, using returns on straddles and out-of-the-money put options as proxies for volatility and jump risk factors. For each market separately, we provide evidence that volatility and jump risk are priced risk factors. There is however little evidence of global unconditional pricing of option returns. Next we investigate the presence of time-variation in the cross-market relationships, and Þnd evidence that UK and US option markets have become increasingly interrelated. Incorporating these time-varying patterns in conditional factor pricing models improves their Þt substantially and generates some evidence of global pricing. * 
A large literature has analyzed local versus global pricing of international equity markets (see Karolyi and Stulz, 2002 , for an excellent survey). For developed markets, most of the evidence points towards a high degree of integration of these markets. This paper is the Þrst to study international pricing of equity index options. There are several reasons why the degree of integration of option markets may differ from equity market integration. First of all, option markets are relatively young, with low trading volume in the 1980s and a tremendous increase in trading over the last 15 years. Secondly, option prices reßect risk premia that are not directly present in equity markets, such as volatility and jump risk premia.
A variety of authors (e.g. Bakshi and Kapadia, 2003, Buraschi and Jackwerth, 2001, Coval and Shumway, 2001, Pan, 2001 , and Jones, 2001 ) have shown that exposure to market risk is not sufficient to explain option returns and that some additional sources of risk seem to be priced. As conjectured in those papers, volatility risk and jump risk are obvious candidates as additional risk factors. This paper offers an extensive analysis of risk factors affecting option returns, both in an unconditional and a conditional asset pricing framework. The analysis is done both 'locally' for the three main global markets, and globally for the pooled world market in order to address issues related to international market integration, contagion and the beneÞts of international diversiÞcation. The conditional analysis aims to provide insight into the time-variation of risk premia and risk exposure.
As a Þrst step, an unconditional local asset pricing model is estimated with time-series on index option returns for each of the three main global markets: the US (S&P 500 index options), Europe (FTSE index options) and Asia (Nikkei 225 index options). We use data on option prices for the period April 1992 to June 2001. For each market, we have a large cross-section of options, with several moneyness levels and maturities. This country-by-country analysis extends Coval and Shumway by explicitly incorporating a volatility risk factor and a jump risk factor, and Jones by studying the European and Asian markets. Atthe-money straddles and out-of-the-money puts constitute the economic factormimicking portfolios for volatility and jump risk factors, respectively. The model is estimated both for the 3 individual markets and for the pooled global market, attempting to uncover the existence of global factors capturing volatility and jump risk that drive option returns.
The local pricing results are as follows. In line with the results for the US, we Þnd clear evidence that the CAPM does not correctly describe expected option returns in the UK and Japan. Next, we show that for the US and UK the inclusion of factors that mimick local volatility and jump risk considerably improves the pricing results, while this is not the case for Japan. In line with the option pricing literature, we Þnd for both the US and UK a negative volatility risk premium and a positive jump risk premium. Turning to the results for the global unconditional pricing models, we provide clear evidence against global pricing of US, UK, and Japan equity index options. Especially for Japan there is no evidence that non-Japan risk factors help in explaining expected option returns. If we exclude Japan from the analysis, the performance of the global pricing model is considerably better.
In a second step, conditional asset pricing models are used to further study and interpret the Þndings from the unconditional analysis. A major advantage of the conditional analysis is that it allows for time-variation in the factor loadings (risk exposure) and/or risk premia. A number of important issues are then analyzed. A Þrst testable hypothesis is whether markets for volatility and jump risk have become more integrated. Evidence of increased integration in markets for volatility and jump risk could shed new light on the issue of contagion of Þnancial crises on a global scale (see Claessens and Forbes, 2001 , for an overview of the contagion literature). Another interesting question is whether the world prices of volatility and jump risk have changed over time. This could be due to increased globalization and contagion (thus changing the beneÞts of international diversiÞcation) or to the growth of the hedge fund industry, which is often proclaimed or believed to pursue option-like strategies, in particular to sell volatility and jump risk. Finally, more complicated dynamics can be allowed for: for instance, exposure to the global risk factors may increase in turbulent times, while local factors matter mainly in normal times, so that markets become more integrated in turbulent times. Option markets are a natural setting to examine this, since they offer a number of interesting proxies for 'market turbulence' (for instance implied volatility and the slope of the 'skew').
The results of the conditional analysis shows that including conditioning information (implied volatility and the implied volatility skew) further decreases the pricing errors of the US/UK model towards the pricing errors of the local models. In addition, a detailed analysis of the time-variation in option returns indicates that US and UK markets have become increasingly integrated over the sample period.
The data we use and the methodology followed to construct option returns is described in the next section. Section 2 analyzes country-speciÞc risk factors in unconditional models. The unconditional global analysis is presented in Section 3. Conditional results are reported in Section 4, both for local and global models. Section 5 concludes.
Data
The empirical analysis is based on time series of returns on three equity indices (S&P 500, FTSE-100, and Nikkei 225), and associated index options. We use Datastream to obtain weekly returns on the three indices, including dividends. We also use Datastream to obtain data on the 1-week Eurodollar US interest rate, the relevant currency rates, and 1-month currency forward rates. For all countries, the sample runs from April 1992 until end of June 2001.
The US option data consist of S&P 500 futures options, which are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The dataset contains daily settlement prices for call and put options with various strike prices and maturities, as well as the associated futures price and other variables such as volume and open interest.
We apply the following data Þlters to eliminate possible data errors. First, we exclude all option prices that are lower than the direct early exercise value. Second, we check the put-call parity relation, which consists of two inequalities for American futures options. Using a bid-ask spread of 1% of the option price and the riskfree rate data, we eliminate all options that do not satisfy this relation.
Since these options are American with the futures as underlying, we apply the following procedure to correct the prices for the early exercise premium. We use a standard binomial tree with 200 time steps to approximate the geometric Brownian motion with constant volatility. Next, we use this tree to calculate the implied volatility of each call and put option in the dataset. Given this implied volatility, the same binomial tree can then be used to compute the early exercise premium for each option and to deduct this premium from the option price. By using a separate volatility parameter for each option at each trading day, we automatically incorporate the volatility skew and changes in volatility over time. Based on this procedure, the early exercise premia turn out to be small, ranging from about 0.2% of the option price for short-maturity options to 1.5% for options with around 1 year to maturity. Compared to options that have the index itself as underlying, these early exercise premia are small because the underlying futures price does not necessarily change at a dividend date. Therefore, even if the model used to calculate the early exercise premia is misspeciÞed, we do not expect that this will lead to important errors in the option returns that are constructed below.
To convert the option price data into returns we follow a similar procedure as in Buraschi and Jackwerth (2001) and Coval and Shumway (2001) . First, we Þx several targets for the strike-to-spot ratio: 92%, 94%, up to 108%. At the Þrst day of each month, we select for each delivery month the option with strike-tospot ratio closest to the target rate. We exclude options that mature in the given month (on the third Friday of that month), since these options may suffer from illiquidity (Bondarenko (2002) ). We divide the month in four (approximately equally-spaced) time periods, and we shall refer to these as (pseudo-)weekly periods. Next, we calculate the (pseudo-)weekly returns on the selected options up to the Þrst day of the subsequent month. In the end, this gives us time series of weekly option returns for several strike-to-spot ratios and maturities.
The choice of the frequency in an international study like ours involves the following trade-off: higher-frequency returns are attractive as they may exhibit interesting conditional dynamics. Simultaneously however, the effect of the difference in international time-zones is exacerbated when the frequency is increased, since returns for different markets are then computed over timeperiods with relatively little overlap. Martens and Poon (2001) have shown that this non-synchronicity problem can seriously bias estimates of daily covariances and conditional correlations. Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2003) face a similar trade-off in their study of asymmetric conditional second moments in international bond and equity returns and analyze weekly returns. We use pseudo-weekly returns rather than weekly returns for the following reasons. First, given the 9 to 10 hour time-difference between the US close and Singapore close, pseudo-weeks of on average 5.25 trading days (= 252=48) correspond to overlapping time-periods that are closer to 5 days than actual weeks. Secondly, by construction we have exactly 4 pseudo-weeks per months, which facilitates interpretation and exposition.
For the UK, we use European options on the FTSE 100 index, traded on LIFFE. Data are obtained from LIFFEData, and contain daily settlement prices for options and associated underlying index values. We apply similar data Þlters as for the US options, now using the lower bounds and put-call parity for European index options. We use the futures prices in the UK data to circumvent estimating the dividend rate.
For the Japanese Nikkei 225 index, we use data from Singapore Exchange (formerly known as SIMEX) on Nikkei 225 index futures and American options on these index futures. While Nikkei futures options also trade 'at home' in Osaka, the time-difference with the US and UK is smaller for Singapore, mitigating somewhat the non-synchronicity problem without sacriÞcing quality of the price data due to illiquidity (Nikkei contracts do trade on CME, which would further reduce the non-synchronicity, but these contracts are extremely illiquid). The data Þltering and construction of the returns series are identical to the procedure described above for the US, since both use American options with index futures as underlying.
Since we want to be able to interpret our results in terms of mispricing that is exploitable by tradable portfolios, we currency-hedge all non-US returns using currency forward rates. Because 1-week forward exchange rates are not available for the entire sample period, we transform 1-month forward rates into 1-week forward rates, assuming that 1-week and 1-month interest rates coincide. Because of the short forward maturity, the error caused by this assumption is most likely small.
Summary Statistics
As a starting point it is useful to review the summary statistics of the underlying indices, reported in Table 1A . For consistency with the option returns analyzed throughout the paper, the index returns have been currency-hedged using forward contracts and thus translated into USD returns. The US index has an average weekly excess return of 0.14% over the sample, resulting in a 6.72% annualized excess return. The US Sharpe ratio for our sample is in line with typical estimates obtained for longer samples: multiplying the weekly Sharpe ratio of 0.0697 with √ 48 (under the assumption of i.i.d. returns) gives an annual Sharpe ratio of 0.4829. The UK currency-hedged index has a very similar average excess return and volatility. The annualized Sharpe ratio is slightly higher at 0.5182. The Japanese index on the other hand behaved quite differently over the sample period. Remarkably, its average excess return is negative. The Japanese index return was furthermore subject to substantially higher volatility. The annualized Sharpe ratio is -0.1954. Tables 1B through 1D report summary statistics for the weekly option returns we use. These returns are currency-hedged and in excess of the riskfree rate (which is the US riskfree rate, given that non-US option returns are currency-hedged). For US short-maturity options, with average remaining maturity of around 1.5 month at the time when the return is computed, mean call option returns are large and increasing in the strike-to-spot ratio, i.e. as the call option is more OTM. Coval and Shumway derive under weak assumptions that expected call option returns exceed the expected return on the underlying and increase with the strike-to-spot ratio and provide empirical evidence for this. This so-called 'leverage effect' also holds in our sample. The call option returns are highly volatile, resulting in modest Sharpe ratios that are actually smaller than for the underlying. Short-maturity put options have negative mean excess returns that are very large in absolute value (e.g. 9.46% per week for puts that have a 0.92 strike-to-spot ratio). Puts that are more OTM have more negative average excess returns, in line with the leverage effect. The Sharpe ratios are now almost three times larger in absolute value than for calls or for the underlying, corresponding to annualized (absolute) Sharpe ratios close to or above 1. Turning to long-maturity options, with average remaining maturity of 10 months at the time when the return is computed, the summary statistics are somewhat different for both calls and puts. Calls have higher Sharpe ratios than their short-maturity equivalent, while puts have less negative Sharpe ratios. From Table 1B , it is clear that short-maturity puts have both the highest (absolute) mean excess return and the highest (absolute) Sharpe ratio. Table 1C . Furthermore, the returns are not monotonically increasing in the strike-to-spot ratio, thus violating the leverage effect. Since the volatility of call option excess returns is not sufficiently lower than in the US sample, the Sharpe ratio is also an order of magnitude smaller. Longmaturity calls on the other hand have somewhat higher mean returns and Sharpe ratios, although still far below their US equivalents, especially far OTM. UK put returns are less negative, but more volatile than US puts, again resulting in lower absolute Sharpe ratios. Finally, it is noteworthy that mean excess returns on long-maturity UK puts decrease with the strike-to-spot ratio, rather than increase as would be expected from the leverage effect. When considering the Japan sample in Table 1D , it is crucial to keep in mind the negative mean excess return on the underlying index. This explains the negative mean excess returns on call options and the positive mean excess returns on puts. Most returns for Nikkei index options are more volatile than for the corresponding S&P index options in Table 1B (or than for FTSE index options in Table 1C ). Sharpe ratios are smaller in absolute value than in Table  1B .
Local Unconditional Pricing
This section analyzes a variety of linear factor models explaining option returns, both locally (for each individual market) and globally (pooling the assets of all markets). As a Þrst step, we follow Coval and Shumway and study the ability of the CAPM to explain option returns. Subsequently, we extend their analysis and explicitly account for other potential sources of priced risk.
For all models analyzed in this paper, we use the well-known two-pass regression methodology (see Cochrane, 2001 ). In the Þrst step we regress (for each option) the time-series of option returns on the time series of factor portfolio returns, which renders factor-beta's and time-series ®'s. We estimate a single time-series regression per option instead of the rolling-regression approach (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) . In Section 4 we allow for time-varying beta's. In the second step, we perform the well-known cross-sectional regression in which average returns across options are regressed on their factor-beta's. The slope coefficients in this regression can be interpreted as the factor risk premia, and the error term contains the cross-sectional pricing errors (®'s). To calculate standard errors and test-statistics for the cross-sectional regression, we use results by Shanken (1992) to correct for the estimation error in the Þrst-step beta's. Finally, for both the time-series and cross-sectional regressions, it is straightforward to perform a Wald test for the hypothesis that pricing errors of all options are equal to zero.
CAPM Results
According to the CAPM, expected returns on an asset are driven only its exposure to non-diversiÞable market risk, as measured by its market beta. When applied to option returns, this is essentially a test of the Black-Scholes model or of market completeness and the redundancy of options (Coval and Shumway). Since we are interested in the relevance and pricing of other sources of risk, like volatility and jump risk, testing the CAPM is a natural Þrst step.
For each of the three markets analyzed we test the CAPM as follows. We use currency-hedged excess returns for both calls and puts, each with 5 levels of moneyness (as in Tables 1B through 1D) and 5 maturity bins, ranging from short-maturity (with an average remaining maturity of 1.5 months when returns are computed) to long-maturity (10 months of average remaining maturity), for a total of 50 options per sample. The excess (currency-hedged) return on the underlying index is taken as a proxy for the excess return on the market. Table  2A summarizes results from OLS time-series regressions for the unconditional CAPM, reporting the pricing error or ® for 8 test assets for each market (along with t-statistics) and the p-value for a Wald test that the pricing errors for the 8 test assets are jointly equal to zero. The 8 test assets consist of calls and puts, both ATM and 8% OTM, and both short-maturity and long-maturity.
For the US, calls have pricing errors that are individually insigniÞcant. Put options however have large negative ®'s that are very signiÞcant, both economically (-6.44% for short-maturity OTM puts) and statistically. The Wald test strongly rejects the CAPM prediction that the time-series intercepts are jointly equal to zero. For the UK sample, mispricing seems largest for short-maturity OTM calls, although only the intercept for the ATM call is statistically signiÞ-cant. The Wald test also rejects the model, although less overwhelmingly than for the US. Short-maturity Nikkei options that are OTM are most mispriced. The time-series version of the CAPM is also rejected with high conÞdence in our third sample. Cross-sectionally, options are on average underpriced by the CAPM in the US. Options have average returns that are much lower than is justiÞed by their exposure to market risk, and seem overpriced relative to the CAPM. The average ® across all 50 assets used in the cross-sectional regression is almost -1% per week. Since the average absolute ® is 0.0095%, virtually all options must have negative ®'s. The market risk premium (¸) estimated in the US crosssection is 0.24% and statistically signiÞcant. This estimate however exceeds the time-series average for the excess return on the US market (0.14%). This can easily be seen in Figure 1A which plots both the security market line according to the time-series version of the CAPM (where the slope is restricted to be the time-series average of the market excess return) and the cross-sectional security market line. Since puts are most mispriced in the time-series regressions, and since these assets have negative beta's, the cross-section minimizes mean squared pricing error by overstating the market risk premium, resulting in the steeper security market line. The R 2 for the CAPM cross-section is high: this is quite natural and reßects the fact that the market index is the underlying of the options and therefore the most important determinant of their returns. The cross-sectional Wald test (for the same 8 test assets as in the time-series regressions) rejects the CAPM.
The CAPM also generates large negative pricing errors for the UK crosssection: on average weekly options returns are 1.5% lower than would be expected based on their beta. Again, virtually all options are underpriced since the average absolute ® is 1.55%. The cross-sectional estimate of the market risk premium is 0.15% and now close to the time-series average of the market excess return (0.16%). This can easily be understood from Figure 1B : both puts (with negative beta's) and calls (positive beta's) are roughly equally overpriced relative to the time-series CAPM. Therefore the cross-section cannot improve by changing the slope of the security market line. The cross-sectional Þt is worse than in the US sample, as is clear from the lower cross-sectional R 2 of 55.24%. The CAPM is also for the UK formally rejected by a Wald test. In contrast to US and UK index options, Nikkei options are on average overpriced by the CAPM, with an average pricing error of 0.94% and average absolute ® of 1%. The cross-sectional estimate of the market price of risk is negative and insigniÞcant. The estimate is more negative than the time-series average of the market excess return (-0.14% versus -0.09%). The downwardsloping security market line for Japanese index options is plotted in Figure 1C . Index options with negative beta's (puts) are slightly more mispriced in the time-series model than positive-beta assets, which explains the steeper crosssectional security market line and therefore the discrepancy between the timeseries average of the market excess return and the cross-sectional estimate of the market risk premium. The Þgure also shows that there is substantial variation in mean option returns that is left unexplained by the CAPM, as is reßected by the R 2 . Since the evidence against the CAPM is strong both economically and statistically, it is worthwhile exploring whether other risk factors are priced into option returns, as is done in the rest of the paper. This may be most promising for the US and UK sample, and more challenging for the Japan sample, since the plots seem to suggest that the mispricing is more systematic for the US and UK, while Nikkei option returns seem more subject to idiosyncratic risk factors affecting particular options.
Multi-Factor Results
The CAPM generates large pricing errors for index options in all 3 markets analyzed. A large literature in option pricing has documented the rejection of the Black-Scholes model and suggested that systematic volatility and jump risk make options non-redundant assets and affect their prices and returns. In order to examine this in detail in our framework, we now consider an unconditional linear multi-factor model. This extends the work of Coval and Shumway by explicitly allowing for other priced factors.
As economically meaningful factor-mimicking portfolios for volatility and jump risk, short-maturity straddles and OTM puts, respectively, are natural candidates. In particular, we use a 'crash-neutral' ATM straddle and an OTM put with 0.96 strike-to-spot ratio. The crash-neutral ATM straddle consists of a long position in an ATM straddle and a short position in a deep OTM put option (0.92 strike-to-spot ratio). By adding an opposite position in a deep OTM put option, the straddle is protected against large crashes or jumps.
1 Coval and Shumway Þrst introduced the crash-neutral straddle (commonly known as a ratio-call spread) in their study of straddle returns in order to mitigate a potential Peso-problem (the ex-post absence of major crashes in the sample). In contrast, we propose the ATM straddle as a factor-mimicking portfolio for a volatility risk factor that may explain expected option returns cross-sectionally (across strikes, maturities, calls and puts and across different markets). We crash-neutralize the straddle not to address potential Peso-problems, but rather in an attempt to partially 'orthogonalize' the factors in an economically meaningful way that is general and not sample-speciÞc: by crash-neutralizing the straddle we reduce its exposure to jump risk, so that the importance and pricing of separate volatility and jump risk factors can be isolated and analyzed.
Finally, since we are ultimately interested in the international pricing of jump and volatility risk, and since we do not want to take a stand on the issue of international integration (or lack thereof) of the markets for the underlying equity indices, we estimate and test the multi-factor model with equity-hedged option returns. The option returns are hedged against movements in the local underlying according to the estimated beta from the CAPM. In other words, we apply the jump and volatility risk factors to excess returns over the CAPM. This procedure is conservative since the CAPM may already take out some exposure to jump and volatility risk to the extent that these sources of risk are correlated with market risk. Only the orthogonal parts are isolated and allowed to be priced separately. As a Þnal expositional advantage, we can interpret and contrast the mispricing and explanatory power of the regressions against the CAPM from the previous subsection.
As for the CAPM, we report both time-series regressions (Table 2C) and cross-sectional results (Table 2D) . For the US sample, introducing a volatility and jump risk factor has a considerable effect, but the mispricing remains large for some assets in the time-series regressions. Now mainly calls are mispriced, while the pricing errors for puts are substantially smaller. This is not surprising since we explicitly allow for a jump risk factor proxied by OTM puts. Call returns are less sensitive to this type of jump risk. However, even though the ®'s are smaller in absolute value for puts, they are still statistically signiÞcant. The Wald test-statistic is substantially smaller than for the single-factor CAPM, but the model can still be rejected at the 97.5% conÞdence level. For the UK on the other hand, the improvement in pricing error is quite substantial, not only for puts, but also for calls. For the 8 test assets reported in Table 2C , all ®'s are less than 1% per week in absolute value and all are individually insigniÞcant. In fact, the model is no longer rejected at the 95% conÞdence level.
Nikkei option returns are more challenging to explain based on volatility and jump risk: mispricing is slightly lower for most puts, but higher for most calls. Short-maturity OTM calls stand out with a signiÞcant ® of 4.5% per week. The Wald test rejects the restriction that mispricing is jointly zero for the 8 test assets.
In the US cross-sectional regression, the average ® is reduced substantially relative to the CAPM (from -0.0094 to -0.0023). The average absolute ® shrinks somewhat less, suggesting that some options appear now underpriced. The estimates for the risk premia¸1 and¸2 are negative, implying a negative volatility risk premium and a positive jump risk premium as has previously been documented empirically. 2 The estimates are in line with the time-series averages for the excess returns on the factors (-0.0167 for the crash-neutral ATM straddle and -0.0478 for the OTM put). The jump risk premium is estimated far more precisely than the volatility risk premium, which is almost signiÞcant. The cross-sectional R 2 is quite high: local jump and volatility risk factors explain 82.99% of the cross-sectional variation in expected option returns that is left unexplained by the CAPM. The remarkable improvement in cross-sectional Þt over the CAPM is also apparent from the Wald test's p-value of 7.84%. Adding a jump and volatility risk factor also helps a lot to explain the cross-section of UK option returns: both the average ® and average absolute ® become much smaller than in Table 2B . Both jump and volatility risk carry risk premia that are very signiÞcant economically and statistically. The estimates of these risk premia are close to the mean excess return for the factor-mimicking portfolios (-0.0219 and -0.0217 respectively), which provides further support in favor of the model. Finally, the cross-sectional R 2 is very large and the model is only marginally rejected by the Wald test.
Mispricing of Nikkei index options is also reduced when accounting for additional sources of risk. The risk premia, however, associated with these risk factors are quite striking. The volatility risk premium is estimated to be positive and the jump risk premium negative, highlighting once more that the Nikkei sample is quite particular. The discrepancy between the estimated volatility and jump risk premia and the mean excess returns on the corresponding factormimicking portfolios (-0.0090 and 0.0209) suggests that the model is misspeciÞed. Only the negative jump risk premium (¸2 > 0) is furthermore statistically signiÞcant. Compared with the US and UK samples, the cross-sectional R 2 is lower, but still very high. Finally, of all three samples, the multi-factor model can be rejected with most conÞdence for Nikkei option returns, both for timeseries regressions and for the cross-section.
We can tentatively conclude that the unconditional multi-factor model that allows for priced jump and volatility risk, performs reasonably well for the US probability and the actual probability. A positive jump risk premium generates high prices of put options and low expected returns.
and UK, but is problematic when confronted with Japanese data. Before examining in Section 4 whether conditioning models can improve on this, we Þrst study global unconditional pricing in the next section.
Unconditional Global Analysis
Having analyzed the local pricing of index options in the three main global markets, we now study whether there is any evidence of global unconditional pricing of volatility and jump risk. In order to be agnostic about international integration of the markets for the local underlying indices, we continue to use excess returns based on the local CAPM, i.e. locally equity-hedged option returns. When pooling the 50 option returns for all three markets, a Þrst question is whether foreign factors help to explain (excess) option returns. According to a stronger version of international pricing only global factors should matter. To test whether a parsimonious global model of this type can explain the world cross-section of index option returns, we aggregate the six local volatility and jump risk factors into two global risk factors (Section 3.3).
Correlations
Before analyzing global pricing of systematic volatility and jump risk, it is useful to know the cross-country correlations between the local factors. Table 3A reports the cross-country correlations of option returns from our 3 samples. Although equity-hedged option returns are used, correlations between the returns on the underlying indices are included for completeness and comparison with option return correlations. While the US and UK equity returns are highly correlated, correlations with the Japanese index are quite low. A similar pattern arises for returns on the two factor-mimicking portfolios. The US-UK correlation for both crash-neutral straddle excess returns and OTM put excess returns are modest, but nontrivial. The returns on the Japanese factors are much less correlated, especially with US returns. This may already suggest that 'fullßedged' global pricing with only global factors being priced, should probably not be taken for granted. 
Pooling the Local Models: a Global Six Factor Model
The Þrst global model simply pools all the local assets and factors, resulting in a cross-section of 150 option excess returns and 6 factors. As always, we report both time-series regressions for individual assets (Table 3B ) and the cross-sectional regression (now a single global regression, Table 3C ). The time-series intercepts generally indicate that adding foreign factors does not lead to large reductions in mispricing. Most ®'s are in fact very similar to what was found when only regressing on local factors. Interestingly, mispricing of Nikkei options actually gets worse for 6 out of 8 test assets, most notably for short-maturity OTM calls and puts. This can already be interpreted as evidence against general global pricing. While the restriction that the intercepts of all 24 test assets are jointly equal to zero is strongly rejected, it is perhaps more insightful to compare the Wald test p-values obtained for each local market with the values obtained for local pricing in the previous section (Table 2C) . Lack of mispricing is now more strongly rejected for Nikkei, somewhat more strongly for the UK sample, while the US p-value is virtually identical.
Consistent with the time-series results, cross-sectional mispricing is marginally smaller for the US, unchanged for the UK and larger for Japan when pooling the assets and factors into a global model. The estimated factor risk premia (ordered as US, UK and Japan straddle, followed by US, UK and Japan put) are also very similar to the local estimates in Table 2D : like the local multi-factor models, the global model does explain the cross-sectional variation in expected option returns quite well, but mispricing remains sufficiently important to formally reject the model. 
A Parsimonious Global Multi-Factor Model
Although the Þrst evidence on global pricing of jump and volatility risk is rather mixed, we now restrict the global model to be more parsimonious. The six local risk factors are aggregated into two global factors: a global crash-neutral ATM straddle and a global OTM put. Each global factor is constructed as a weighted average of the three corresponding local factors, with weights based on PrincipalComponent Analysis applied to the correlation matrix (using the Þrst principal component). The cross-sectional regression provides more evidence against unconditional global pricing. On average, the model substantially underprices US and UK calls and puts, and overprices Japanese assets. The factor risk premia¸1 and¸2 are close to zero, insigniÞcant and quite different from the average excess returns on the factors (-0.0184 for the global volatility risk factor and -0.0251 for the global jump risk factor). This is less surprising when keeping in mind that US/UK estimates versus Japan estimates have opposite signs in Table 2D . Finally, the very low R 2 and Wald p-value further illustrate the poor performance of the global two-factor model. 
Does US/UK 'Global' Pricing Hold?
While the failure of the world model might so far certainly be due to the absence of any conditioning information so far (Section 4 will remedy this), it may also be caused by the presence of the very peculiar Nikkei sample. Japan behaves totally differently from the US and UK market: the correlations of Japanese factor returns with those of other markets is very low, the Nikkei factor risk premia (including the market risk premium) have the wrong sign, adding multiple factors does not improve much over the CAPM and adding foreign factors actually worsens the mispricing of options. For those reasons, we now exclude the Japanese option returns from the analysis and focus on a less ambitious 'global' model comprised solely of US and UK assets and factors. The 'global' factors can again be obtained using PCA on the correlation matrix, for US and UK only. But given that there are only two local factors to average, the weight is now 50/50 by construction. Relative to the full-blown global model in Table 4A , the time-series intercepts in Table 4C always decrease in absolute value for US option returns. The ability of the global risk factors to explain the time-series movement in US options is improved when the inßuence of the Japanese local factor is removed. Mispricing remains nonetheless substantial economically and is signiÞcantly different from zero for 5 of the 8 test assets. Surprisingly, the time-series ®'s increase for most UK option returns. All but one are insigniÞcant however. It is also interesting to compare the intercepts of the 'global' US/UK model with those of the simple CAPM in Table 2A . While US puts are less mispriced when accounting for a US/UK jump and volatility risk factor, call intercepts actually become large and positive, and all but one are statistically signiÞcant. A 'global' jump and volatility risk factor does not seem to explain excess returns on US call options. On the other hand, the time-series variation in virtually all UK option returns can be accounted for to a larger extent when the US/UK volatility and jump risk factors are introduced. The parsimonious model fares better cross-sectionally when Japan is excluded. The average |®| decreases from 0.0158 to 0.0101 for US options and from 0.0127 to 0.0102 in the UK. Mispricing is larger though than in the local multi-factor model or in the global 6-factor model. While the US/UK factors reduce mispricing substantially for UK options relative to the CAPM, the average absolute ® actually becomes marginally larger in the US. The estimated risk premia are very reasonable (-0.0098 and -0.0344) and signiÞcant (-3.52 and -9.24). The market price of 'global' volatility and jump risk lies in between the corresponding local values found previously for the US and UK separately. The R 2 of the cross-sectional regression is fairly high: the global factors explain roughly half the variation in CAPM-based excess option returns.
Conditional Analysis
The weak evidence of global pricing established in the previous section might be attributable to the lack of conditioning information. Global pricing of volatility and jump risk might hold conditionally, even though it is rejected unconditionally. Furthermore, introducing conditioning information allows us to address interesting questions concerning low-frequency changes in market integration and in risk premia, and high-frequency time-variation in global correlations and contagion potential in option markets.
Time-Varying Factor Risk Premia and Correlations
Before analyzing formal conditional factor models in detail, it is useful to try and detect any time-variation in local risk premia and in cross-market correlations without relying on particular models.
Figures 2A through 2C show time-series plots of local prices of volatility and jump risk for our 3 samples. The price of risk is measured as the average return in excess of the CAPM on the factor-mimicking portfolio (crash-neutral ATM straddle for volatility risk and OTM put for jump risk) over a rolling two-year period. For the US, both risk premia seem to shrink over time and get closer to zero. A similar pattern, though somewhat less pronounced, can be seen for the UK in Figure 2B . Japan however behaves differently. Except for the very large spike in the price of jump risk, and to a lesser extent for volatility risk, during 1995 and 1996, there is little time-variation in risk premia and no clear trends emerge. The spike coincides with the Kobe earthquake of January 17 1995 and the resulting turbulence of the Nikkei index, followed on February 27 by the collapse and receivership of Barings subsequent to Nick Leeson's speculation in Nikkei-related assets. Needless to say, these events had a major impact on Nikkei options. The 96% OTM put for instance had a return of 1700% during the week of January 17. It is important to point out that all previous results, including the lack of global pricing, are robust to the exclusion of this extreme observation.
The low-frequency decrease in local prices of risk, at least for the US and UK, may be due to the increased importance of global risk factors or to better (local or international) risk-sharing (e.g. because option markets have matured over time, or because of the growth of the hedge fund industry, often proclaimed or believed to pursue option-like strategies, in particular to trade volatility and jump risk). Figures 3A and 3B offer a different perspective that may shed more light on this question. If it is the case that local prices of risk decline because global factors become more important and markets more integrated internationally, then we would expect a corresponding increase in the comovement of option returns across markets. To examine whether markets for volatility and jump risk have become more integrated and resulted in higher cross-market correlations, we calculate cross-country correlations for excess returns on crash-neutral straddles (the volatility risk factor) and on OTM puts (the jump risk factor) over a two-year rolling window. Consistent with the hypothesis of increased market integration, correlations between US straddles and UK straddles, and between US puts and UK puts exhibit a clear upward trend in Figures 3A and  3B , respectively. Correlations between Nikkei risk factors and US or UK risk factors are low throughout the sample period and do not reveal any pattern of time-variation. Japanese option returns have been demonstrated before to be by and large independent of foreign factors and market movements, and this independence seems rather stable over time. The US-UK comovement on the other hand is quite interesting and motivates the subsequent formal conditional analysis.
To handle conditioning information more formally, we introduce instruments that will be used in the next subsection to estimate conditional versions of the linear multi-factor models considered in Sections 2 and 3. Natural choices for instruments that might predict changes in expected option returns are the implied volatility of ATM options and the implied volatility skew (deÞned as the difference between the implied volatility of 0.92 OTM puts and of ATM puts). Since implied volatility would be expected to carry information about the pricing of future volatility risk, it is used as an instrument for the volatility risk factor. The implied volatility skew is often thought of as some measure of 'crash-imminence', making it a potential instrument for jump or crash risk.
As a Þrst step, we now use the instruments to investigate whether there is any high-frequency time-variation in cross-country correlations. We divide the sample period in subperiods according to quartiles for the two instruments (each are equally-weighted world averages of the corresponding three local instruments). We can then calculate cross-country correlations for option returns for each subperiod or regime for the relevant instrument. This yields correlations that are conditional on whether the instrument is in the 'high' (top quartile), 'intermediate' (middle quartiles), or 'low' (bottom quartile) regime. Table 5A shows that cross-country correlations do change depending on the value of the instrument, but not always as would be expected. During periods of low global implied volatility, US and UK excess straddle returns have a lower correlation than when IV is higher. The same is true for the US-Japan correlation: when global IV is low, excess straddle returns are actually negatively correlated. Less intuitive however is that the correlation between US and Japan, and between UK and Japan is actually highest when global implied volatility is in the intermediate regime. Although no formal test is conducted, this might be interpreted as evidence against a contagion hypothesis according to which option returns or risk factors become more highly correlated during times of global turbulence (high global IV), at least as far as Japan is concerned.
Conditional correlations between US and UK put returns are highest during periods of low and high IV skew. Put returns tend to comove more closely when markets are globally least or most crash-averse. Japanese put returns are most highly correlated with returns on US and UK puts when the global skew is lowest. During high-skew regimes, Japanese puts are actually negatively correlated with the rest of the world. To gain further insight into these results, it is important to understand the time-series correlations between the local instruments, since the global instruments used so far are simple equally-weighted averages of the local ones. As can be seen informally from Figure 4A and 4B, US implied volatility and UK implied volatility comove rather closely. US skew and UK skew do as well, but less so. The Japanese instrument however is less correlated with its US or UK equivalent, especially for the IV skew (the correlation coefficient is essentially zero). This suggests that crisper conditional correlations between US and UK excess returns may obtain if the inßuence of the Japanese instrument on the global aggregate is removed, very much like was done in the 'global' US/UK unconditional pricing model in section 3.4. Results for the US/UK instruments (plotted in Figure 4C ) are presented in the last column of Table 5A (labeled US-UK*) and are quite compelling. US-UK cross-market correlations are now strongly monotonically increasing with the instrument. When US/UK implied volatility is high, straddle returns become quite correlated (correlation coefficient of 38%). The effect is most pronounced for the correlation between US and UK put returns, which exceeds 51% during the high-skew regime. At least for the US and UK, the markets for jump and volatility risk seem more integrated during turbulent times. This is consistent with a contagion hypothesis and also potentially with a downside correlation hypothesis (see Harvey and Siddique (2000) for an equity-market application), according to which correlations increase during down-markets. Das and Uppal (2001) argue that downward jumps in international equity indices tend to occur at the same time, and Lon-gin and Solnik (2001) show that there is increased cross-country equity index correlation in bear markets, but not in bull markets.
Conditional Factor Models
We now estimate and test formal conditional factor models. Starting from the unconditional models studied before, we allow for conditioning information by introducing the two instruments suggested in the previous subsection, ATM implied volatility and the implied volatility skew, so as to allow for time-variation in beta's and risk premia.
For brevity, we focus on cross-sectional regressions. Also, it can be noted that given the relatively small number of test assets combined with the larger number of factors in the local conditional models, the local conditional models are never rejected by a Wald test. We will therefore focus on economic signiÞcance, and not on Wald tests.
Local Conditional Factor Model
As before, we start with local factor models. The conditional versions of the (unconditional) local two-factor model of section 2.2, as well as of the parsimonious (unconditional) global two-factor model of section 3.3, imply generally an unconditional six-factor model when a single instrument is used to 'scale' each factor (following the terminology of Cochrane, 2001 ). The Þrst two factors are the original unscaled factors, the next two are the scaled factors (the excess return on ATM straddles times ATM implied volatility, and the excess return on OTM puts times the implied volatility skew), while the last two factors are simply the instruments themselves. When implementing these models in our context, the majority of the time-series beta's for the Þfth and sixth factors are insigniÞcant, for all samples. Factors 5 and 6 may therefore well end up acting as 'useless factors' (Kan and Zhang, 1999) . We therefore dropped these last two factors from the analysis and instead report results only for more tightly parametrized four-factor models (both locally and globally). The omitted factors have in fact no cross-sectional pricing implications, except for the Nikkei sample.
Adding scaled factors to the US local model improves mispricing substantially. The average ® shrinks from -0.0023 to -0.0012, while the average absolute ® is reduced from 0.53% per week to 0.42% per week. The unconditional factor risk premia (¸1 and¸2) survive and are very close to the estimates of Table  2D . The volatility risk premium becomes more signiÞcant and is now closer to the time-series average of the excess return on the factor-mimicking portfolio. Conditionally only skew timing (factor 4) seems to be priced. The R 2 improves somewhat and the conditional two-factor model explains almost 92% of the variation in US equity-hedged option returns. Results for the UK sample are essentially unaffected by the incorporation of conditioning information. The mispricing hardly changes and the risk premia associated with the scaled factors are zero. Both the volatility and jump risk premia remain very signiÞcant and are close in value to the time-series mean excess return on the factors. The fact that conditioning information does not seem to help to explain the UK cross-section is also clear from the unchanged R 2 .
Like for the UK sample, adding scaled factors has no impact on local pricing of Nikkei options, as can be seen from the last column of Table 5B.
Global Conditional Factor Model
The parsimonious unconditional global pricing model that attempts to explain the world cross-section of excess option returns based solely on a global volatility risk and a global jump risk factor was strongly rejected in section 3.3. It was conjectured that this rejection might be due to the lack of conditioning information.
Average mispricing and average absolute mispricing is substantially reduced in Table 6A by the introduction of the two scaled factors. The improvement in ®'s is most impressive for US assets and smallest for Nikkei options. Furthermore, all risk premia, including the ones associated with the scaled factors, are large and signiÞcantly negative. This is a major improvement over the unconditional global two-factor model, where neither the volatility risk premium nor the market price of global jump risk was singiÞcantly different from zero. Equally remarkable is the increase in R 2 from 7.75% to 65.2%. Nonetheless, the conditional global model is still formally rejected at the 1% conÞdence level, albeit less overwhelmingly than before.
Despite the particular characteristics of the Nikkei sample therefore, there seems to be some global pricing of volatility and jump risk, at least conditionally. 
US/UK 'Global' Conditional Factor Model
As a Þnal step, we now omit the Nikkei options, factors and instruments from the global model to investigate whether the US/UK 'global' model sees the same improvement in explanatory power when adding scaled factors. This would be expected based on the conditional correlations presented in the previous subsection (the US/UK* column in Table 5A ). Alternatively, this model can be viewed as a sensitivity check of the robustness of global pricing to the exclusion of the peculiar Japan sample from the analysis. Conditioning information lowers the average absolute ® from 0.0101 to 0.0059 for the US and from 0.0102 to 0.0081 for the UK. This brings the (conditional) 'global' model quite close to the (unconditional) local model in terms of pricing error, especially for the US (average |®| of 0.0053 for the US local model and 0.0051 for the UK model). As in the unconditional model, both¸1 anḑ 2 are sensible and signiÞcant. Additionally, the scaled factors are priced, carrying risk premia that are somewhat different from the ones in Table 6A . The change in point estimates for¸3 and¸4 is not alarming, but quite natural since the omission of Japan from the sample has substantially changed the third and fourth factor (both through the effect on the unscaled factor and through the effect on the 'global' instrument used to scale). The R 2 increases from 48% to 71%. Finally, the restrictions of the global model are no longer rejected at the 1% conÞdence level based on a Wald test (p-value becomes 0.0352 instead of 0.0017).
Conclusion
We use data on index option prices for the period April 1992 to June 2001 and document a number of intriguing results for the US, UK, and Japan option markets. We start by extending Coval and Shumway (2001) and test the CAPM for UK and Japan option returns. In line with the results for the US, we Þnd clear evidence that the CAPM does not correctly predict expected option returns in the UK and Japan. Next, we show that for the US and UK the inclusion of factors that mimick local volatility and jump risk considerably improves the pricing results, while this is not the case for Japan. In line with the option pricing literature, we Þnd for both the US and UK a negative volatility risk premium and a positive jump risk premium.
We then analyze whether the country-speciÞc factor pricing models can be reduced to a single global pricing model, which would imply perfectly integrated option markets. The results provide clear evidence against global pricing of US, UK, and Japan equity index options. Especially for Japan there is no evidence that non-Japan risk factors help in explaining expected option returns. If we exclude Japan from the analysis, the performance of the global pricing model is considerably better. Including conditioning information (implied volatility and the implied volatility skew) further decreases the pricing errors of this US/UK model towards the pricing errors of the local models. In addition, a detailed analysis of the time variation in option returns indicates that US and UK markets have become increasingly integrated over the sample period.
Several questions remain. Clearly, it would be interesting to understand the seemingly anomalous behavior of Japanese option returns. Given that option returns in Japan are less systematically related across strike prices and maturities, an analysis of the impact and pricing of (option-series speciÞc) liquidity would be interesting. Also, to further understand the differences across countries, it may be interesting to link the volatility and jump risk factors to economic fundamentals. 
